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ENGAGING THE TAMIL DIASPORA IN PEACE-BUILDING EFFORTS IN SRI 
LANKA 
 
  Michael Potters 
 
Refugees who have fled the conflict in Sri Lanka have formed large diaspora communities across 
the globe, forming one of the largest in Toronto, Canada. Members of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have infiltrated these communities and elicited funding from its members, 
through both coercion and consent, to continue the fight in their home country. This paper will 
outline the importance of including these diaspora communities in peace-building efforts, and 
will propose a three-tier solution to enable these contributions.  
 
On the morning of October 17, 2009, Canadian authorities seized the vessel Ocean Lady off the 
coast of British Columbia, Canada. The ship had entered Canadian waters with 76 Tamil 
refugees on board, fleeing persecution and violence in the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s long and 
violent civil war. This was the first group of refugees to arrive in Canada by boat in more than 20 
years, but more importantly, it was the first large group of people to arrive in Canada since the 
end of the war in Sri Lanka in May 2009.1  
Since the beginning of the war in 1983, Canada has accepted thousands of Tamil refugees 
from Sri Lanka. From a population of fewer than 2,000 Tamils in 1983, Canada’s Tamil 
population has grown to between 110,000 to 200,000 persons,2 90 percent of whom live in 
Toronto.3 The arrival of the Ocean Lady was significant. It not only brought attention to the 
humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka, but also to the significance of Canada’s Tamil diaspora – the 
largest in the world – and their role in the affairs of their homeland.4  
                                                
1 Canadian Tamil Congress, “The Case of Ocean Lady's 76 Tamil Refugees,” accessed March 
25, 2010, www.canadiantamilcongress.ca. 
2  International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora After the LTTE,” February 2010, 
accessed March 25, 2010, www.crisisgroup.org. 
3 Sarah Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan 
Tamil Diaspora," Review of International Studies 30, no. 3 (July 2004): 405-426, accessed 
March 25, 2010, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097925. 
4 Ibid., 418. 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the role and significance of the transnational Tamil 
diaspora in relation to the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, with emphasis on the Canadian 
diaspora, particularly in Toronto, and support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
First, it will examine the role of the Tamil diaspora in the perpetuation or prevention of conflict 
in Sri Lanka. This section will begin with an explanation of the history of the civil war in Sri 
Lanka.  Second, it will explain the continually evolving role of the diaspora in relation to the 
conflict. The paper will conclude with a three-tier prescription for diaspora involvement in 
peace-building efforts. 
In order to understand the role of the transnational diaspora network in the civil conflict of 
Sri Lanka, it is important to understand its history. Sri Lanka is an island state in the Indian 
Ocean, south of India. Its population is divided into four ethno-religious groups. The Sinhalese 
majority compromise approximately 74 percent of the population and control the government. 
They are primarily Theravada Buddhist, speak the Sinhala language, and populate the southern 
and central parts of the country.5  Sri Lankan Tamils make up 11 percent of the population. They 
are mostly Hindus, and most of them settled in the northern part of the island around the city 
Jaffna. The two other groups are the ‘up-country’ Tamils, as well as the Sri Lankan Moors.6 The 
conflict, however, is largely between the Sinhalese Majority, and the Sri Lankan Tamil minority.  
Since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, the Tamils have demanded more power and 
better representation in government in order to protect their interests and autonomy from the 
Sinhalese majority. The Tamil demand for representational power in government, however, was 
                                                
5 Ibid., 412. 
6 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
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not accommodated.7 Eventually, disillusioned by conventional politics, many Tamils began to 
argue for the creation of a separate Tamil state called Eelam. A secessionist agenda was born as 
an ethnic consciousness and sense of nationalism developed within the Tamil population. In 
1975, The LTTE became the guerilla organization at the forefront of the secessionist struggle, 
harnessing the frustrations of the Tamil minority and becoming the ‘sole spokesman’ of the 
Tamil quest for sovereign statehood.8 As frustrations mounted, violence escalated, and Tamil 
youth in particular began to participate in the insurgency movement.9  A civil war erupted in the 
northeastern part of the country in 1983, between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and 
continued until the official military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009.  
Since 1983, the conflict between the Tamil separatists and Sinhalese government forces in 
Sri Lanka has claimed over 65,000 lives and displaced over a million persons.10 The tragic loss 
of life cannot be understated. According to scholars however, the displacement and upheaval of 
Sri Lanka’s Tamil population, both internally and through migration abroad, is one of the most 
significant consequences of the war.11 Formed by several migration waves since independence in 
1948, the Tamil diaspora is estimated at one million as of 2010, or approximately one quarter of 
the entire Sri Lankan Tamil population.12 Tamils abroad, despite their diversity – including date 
of arrival, length of stay, and legal status in their host countries, gender, caste, region, socio-
                                                
7 For further discussion and a brief history on the issue of political accommodation for the Tamil 
minority, see the section in Wayland entitled “Overview of Ethnicity and Conflict in Sri Lanka” 
(pg. 411-415). 
8 Sumantra Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India, and the Tamil Eelam Movement 
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 87. 
9 For further discussion on the importance of radicalization of Tamil youth, see Bose, pg. 114. 
10 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 414. 
11 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
12 Ibid. 
3
Potters: Engaging the Tamil Diaspora in Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lank
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010
  263 
economic standing and political orientation – usually continue see themselves as belonging to the 
diaspora.13  
Sarah Wayland, research associate at the Centre for Excellence on Immigration and 
Settlement - Toronto, defines the modern diaspora in her piece, “Ethnonational Networks and 
Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora.” She states, “A diaspora is a type 
of transnational community that has been dispersed from its homeland, whose members 
permanently reside in one or more ‘host countries,’ and possess a collective, sometimes 
idealized, myth of the homeland and will to return.”14 Gabriel Sheffer, Professor of Political 
Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, adds more to this definition by describing 
fundamental characteristics of the modern diaspora: 
They maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly derived 
from their homelands and related to them ... display communal solidarity, which gives 
rise to social cohesion ... They are engaged in a variety of cultural, social, political and 
economic exchanges with their homelands, which might be states or territories within 
states ... often create trans-state networks that permit and encourage exchanges of 
significant resources, such as money, manpower, political support, and cultural 
influence, with their homelands as well as with other parts of the same diaspora. 15 
 
Further, Wayland focuses on and describes the Tamil diaspora in particular. She states,   
Diasporas such as the Tamil one exist largely because of ethno-nationalist conflict and 
persecution in the homeland. The Tamil diaspora in particular is comprised of refugees 
and exiles who are forced to leave their home country because of conflict rather than 
because of economic need or the wish to forge a new life abroad. 16 
 
Once accepted into liberal democratic host countries with refugee status, it becomes 
possible for the diaspora to express Tamil linguistic, cultural, and religious identity as never 
before. Tamils who migrate from a closed society to one that is open capitalize on the country’s 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 408. 
15 Gabriel Sheffer, "Ethno-National Diasporas and Security," Survival 36, no. 1 (1994): 60. 
16 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 418. 
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freedoms to publish, organize, and accumulate financial resources to an extent that was not 
possible in their homeland.17 This collective sense of empowerment in combination with a 
shared vision of an independent state of Eelam in their home country provides an opportunity 
structure whereby social, political, and financial support is mobilized. In the case of the Sri 
Lankan Tamils, this was consolidated in the LTTE. 
The LTTE claims to represent the political interests of the Tamils. Before its defeat, it 
consistently propagated a three-fold message through its political and diplomatic activities in an 
effort to condemn the Sri Lankan government and strengthen political support for the 
insurgency, both within the diaspora and outside of it.18 Christine Fair, assistant professor at the 
Centre for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, explains this three-fold 
message propagated by the LTTE,  
That Tamils in Sri Lanka are innocent victims of military repression by Sri Lanka’s 
security forces and of Sinhalese anti-Tamil discrimination; That the LTTE is the only 
legitimate voice of the Tamils and is the only vehicle capable of defending and 
promoting Tamil interests in Sri Lanka; There can be no peace until Tamil’s achieve 
their own independent state under the LTTE’s leadership.19 
 
It would appear from this message that the Tamil community is united under the banner of 
the LTTE. However, this may not be the case. The diaspora community is divided in this respect. 
Not every diaspora Tamil donates funds to the LTTE or supports them politically, and countless 
Tamils have fallen victim to LTTE violence.20 Throughout the 1980s, the LTTE waged war and 
conducted a campaign of assassinations and bombings against rival militants and moderate 
                                                
17 Ibid., 417. 
18 Christine C. Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and 
Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11, no. 1 (2005): 143, accessed 
March 25, 2010, doi:10.1080/13537110590927845. 
19 Ibid. 
20 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
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Tamils in an effort to silence dissent and consolidate support in Sri Lanka.21 This intolerance and 
violence forced many Tamils to seek refuge abroad. As a result of their exile, some Tamils feel a 
sense of victimization and injustice by the LTTE and do not support them.22 Others support the 
LTTE to satisfy feelings of guilt for leaving their homeland behind.23 In this sense, it is very 
difficult to determine the true level of diaspora support for the LTTE insurgency.  
The fact remains, however, that the diaspora community plays a major role in the conflict 
through varying degrees of support for the LTTE. As Fair explains, “The diaspora has been a 
fundamental component of the Tamil insurgency and the backbone of the LTTE’s global 
operations.”24 Since 1980, the LTTE has established a global network of offices and cells that 
spans at least 40 countries and is unrivaled by any other insurgent organization.25 This network, 
or what Fair describes as a “global infrastructure,” is based to a great extent on the support and 
participation of the diaspora.26  
Wayland describes three fundamental activities Tamil elites used to mobilize diaspora 
activity, ultimately impacting the conflict in Sri Lanka.  These activities were: “information 
exchange within the Tamil community via Tamil language newspapers, radio, the Internet and 
ethnic organizations; spreading awareness of the Tamil struggle through marches, conferences, 
and the lobbying of government officials; and lawful as well as illegal fundraising.27 All three 
types of activities, namely Intra-Tamil communication, outreach from the community and 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 For further readings on the importance of guilt in Tamil support for the LTTE, see Chapter D 
“Creating One Voice”, in the issue brief titled “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,” 
by the International Crisis Group.  
24 Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," 139. 
25 Ibid., 140. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 418 
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political lobbying and fundraising, reinforce a proud, independent Tamil identity.28 The impact 
of these activities played a crucial role in the civil war in Sri Lanka and may continue to play a 
role in the future. 
Tamil diaspora networks and communications are a rich and fundamental element of 
Tamil identity formation and group cohesion. This is evident in the rise of the Tamil society in 
Toronto over the past two decades.29 In 2004, there were ten weekly Tamil language 
newspapers, four Tamil language radio stations broadcast seven days a week, three cinemas 
showing Tamil language films, and many other outlets of Tamil expression and information 
exchange in Toronto.30 
The internet has also provided a very important means of communication among Tamils. 
Tamil websites provide access to news about Sri Lanka, often analyzing current events with a 
Tamil perspective and providing an up-to-date chronology of the conflict in the homeland. The 
internet has also been extensively used to establish cyber communities, chat rooms and user 
groups.31  These networks and forms of technological communication are crucial to reinforcing 
the Tamil ethnonational identity and affiliation with their homeland. Moreover, they are used by 
elements of the LTTE to consolidate support for their efforts.32 Through these networks, the 
LTTE, or supporters of the LTTE, distribute propaganda and manage the perception of the 
conflict in the homeland, further legitimizing their image as protectors of the interests of 
Tamils.33 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 419. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 139. 
32 Ibid., 143. 
33 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 418. 
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Tamil identity networks are reinforced by political mobilization in the form of 
conferences, marches, and various types of advocacy or lobbying.34 This is a major activity of 
the diaspora in the host countries.35 The increasing number of refugees and their transition from 
refugee claimants to citizens or permanent residents has empowered and enabled the diaspora to 
become influential players in the politics of their host countries, capable of bringing attention to 
the Tamil issue and impacting policy.  
Before being labeled a terrorist organization in 2001 by the United Nations, the LTTE 
lobbied host governments through umbrella organizations, openly espousing its secessionist 
agenda and ‘three-fold message.’36 In Canada, lobbying was primarily conducted by the 
Federation of Association of Canadian Tamils (FACT), an LTTE umbrella organization of ten 
Tamil associations with a pro-secessionist stance.37 Since 2001, political participation has 
evolved. Supporters of the LTTE in the diaspora now focus on working within the system by 
getting Tamils elected to office and using electoral clout and money to influence policy 
makers.38 Even those pro-LTTE diaspora initiatives carrying forward the struggle for an 
independent state in democratic and transparent ways remain committed to the LTTE’s agenda.39  
The LTTE have been very effective at mobilizing the massive Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. 
This mobilization is described by Fair as the “economic backbone of the militant campaign,” and 
is carried out through both coerced and consensual contributions.40 Sometimes this money is 
                                                
34 Ibid., 420. 
35 R. Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post-
Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka,” Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies (September 2003): 10-12, 
www.sangam.org/articles/view2/523.pdf. 
36 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," 142-144. 
37 Ibid. 
38 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
39 Ibid., 23.  
40 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," 140. 
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given willingly out of belief that the efforts of the LTTE are the only way to achieve autonomy 
and security for the Sri Lankan Tamils. In other cases, ‘donations’ are collected like a tax by 
force, by the threat of force, or through the exploitation of individuals who may be in a given 
country illegally and are seeking protection or assistance from the LTTE.41 This ‘tax’ system is 
used to ensure a regular flow of income to the LTTE. In Canada, the minimum tax was roughly 
$30 per person or family per month depending on the individual’s income,42 and other sources 
allege that Tamil businesses abroad are forced to pay Tigers a portion of their earnings.43 
Significant funds also come from individual contributions through community temples, cultural 
and political events, as well as other activities held in support of the Tamil population.44  
It is important to note that Tamils in Canada are not alone in supporting the LTTE from 
abroad. Yet, the Canadian connection is very significant. As a police spokesman in the largest 
city and commercial capital of Sri Lanka, Colombo, stated, “Canada has been a hotbed of the 
Tigers. That is where the biggest contributions come from.”45 In Toronto, in particular, police 
claim that LTTE supporters sent as much as $1 million Canadian a month to finance the war in 
Sri Lanka.46 
                                                
41 Ibid., 141. 
42 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
43 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 141.  
*This is described by Fair as “proxy lending” by the LTTE. The LTTE puts up an initial 
investment in Tamil-run small businesses abroad. The profits made are then split between the 
LTTE and the owner. Fair claims that if the figures still remain valid from the mid 1990’s, this 
proxy lending in Canada generates roughly $1 million per month.  
 
44 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
45 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 422. 
46 Ibid., 421 
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The Sri Lankan government estimates that the LTTE’s overseas fundraising reached $80 
million per year.47  During the conflict, funds raised from abroad were used for destruction and 
reconstruction alike. Initially, most of the money was used for sustaining Tamil societies in war 
affected areas. However, as the war continued, increasing amounts shifted away from 
humanitarian aid towards sustaining the insurgency.48 Despite the military defeat of the LTTE in 
May 2009, pro-LTTE elements of the diaspora continue to raise funds in order to carry forward 
the struggle.49  
The defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka has left much of the diaspora in a state of shock and 
denial, and has caused a reevaluation of the role that the diaspora plays in the affairs of the 
homeland.  There is a general acceptance amongst some Tamils across the globe and political 
spectrum that the LTTE is a spent military force with little chance of returning.50 Most of the 
pro-LTTE elements of the diaspora have acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, that militancy has 
failed and the struggle for an independent Tamil state should proceed non-violently. However, 
the more hardline elements of the diaspora would still prefer the LTTE to be fighting for Tamil 
Eelam, choosing militancy over peaceful politics and ignoring its failure.51 Some leaders who 
have been considered radical in their politics have been frustrated by what they perceive as a 
                                                
47 Ibid., 421.  
*This figure is disputed by Tamil leaders, claiming it is much less than $80 million. Tamil 
leaders claim it is impossible for such a newly formed diaspora to raise such a large sum, a sum 
that would require average annual contributions of more than $100 from every Tamil individual 
living overseas. 
 
48 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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lack of attention being paid to the Tamil situation. These leaders choose unconventional and 
sometimes illegal means to convey their message.52  
It is clear that as the diaspora struggles with new political realities, and as new strategies 
emerge, so too will divergent opinions on a way forward. Yossi Shain, professor of comparative 
government and diaspora politics at Georgetown University, explains this in his article entitled 
“The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation and Resolution.”  He states, “When the conflict 
is hot and the homeland is under severe threat, diaspora concerns about the homeland’s 
existential survival are paramount, and divergent opinions may be subsumed under a broader 
show of support. But when the possibility of peace arises, homeland-diaspora debates and power 
struggles emerge.”53 In the case of Sri Lanka, the possibility of peace has arrived. These internal 
struggles should be carefully negotiated in order to prevent a return to the violent LTTE agenda.  
In the field of conflict resolution, the current stage of this particular conflict might be 
referred to as the conflict de-escalation and negotiation stage. This stage is crucial for the 
creation and maintenance of peace. As this article has explained, the diaspora have played a 
critical role in the conflict through the support of the LTTE insurgency. With the defeat of the 
LTTE, there is room to reconstruct a peaceful agreement between the Tamil community and the 
Sri Lankan government, with the support of the well-established Tamil diaspora. In order to 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," SAIS Review 22, 
no. 2 (July 2002): 135, accessed March 25, 2010, 
http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/10883142/v22i0002/115_trodicpor. 
*Divergent opinions exist within the diaspora community, but also exist between the diaspora 
and the Tamil community that remains in Sri Lanka - between homeland and diaspora. There is 
considerable difference in the opinions of these two groups, although they may share a common 
goal. However, for the purpose of this essay, the difference in opinion between these two groups 
will not be discussed in detail. For more information on these differences, see the section 
“Divergent Opinions,” in “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE” by the International Crisis 
Group.   
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avoid a reemergence of conflict, all elements of the diaspora community must be considered as 
important factors in the negotiation process.  
I suggest a three-tier prescription for engaging the Tamil diaspora in peace-building efforts 
in Sri Lanka. The first tier of this prescription focuses on the role of host governments. Host 
governments should acknowledge the significance of diaspora communities in relation to 
homeland conflict and engage them. Governments have the necessary task and responsibility of 
ensuring public safety and security, as well as promoting peace abroad.  Therefore, it is 
important that host governments better understand the nature of all diaspora within their borders, 
and their connection to conflict in their homelands. Governments, including the Canadian 
government, should acknowledge the possibilities and benefits of engagement of diaspora 
communities and incorporate them in policy-making decisions.  
The second tier focuses on the relationship between the host government and the diaspora 
community. This relationship should be built by encouraging the diaspora community to commit 
to peaceful engagement with the Sri Lankan government. Governments may be reluctant to 
engage with a non-state group that engages in, or supports, the use of violence. For many host 
governments, however, a simple rejection of violence by diaspora groups, although a major first 
step in working towards peace, is insufficient for them to completely support diaspora efforts. In 
order for the host government to commit to the diaspora, diaspora leaders would not only have to 
reject violence, but also reconsider the separatist and illiberal policies of the LTTE, as well as 
recognize the damage that the LTTE has done to communities in Sri Lanka and to the Tamil 
struggle in general. Consensus within the diaspora in this regard is a goal to work towards. This 
major shift in strategy can be facilitated with the help of the host governments.  
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The third tier will, in effect, determine the attractiveness of the second tier. It focuses on 
the host government and the international community. By encouraging consensus on the need for 
non-violence within the diaspora, the host government and the international community can 
increase pressure on the Sri Lankan government to address Tamil grievances. This could take the 
form of a reconciliation process or institutional reforms at the state and local level. Most 
importantly, reforms should be made in Sri Lanka which empower and support minority political 
forces and promote a more democratic Tamil community. The Sri Lankan government will also 
need to address the longstanding sense of marginalization, disrespect, and insecurity amongst the 
Tamil minority which essentially gave rise to the LTTE.  
This paper has explained the significance of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in relation to 
the conflict in Sri Lanka through support of the LTTE insurgency. It has described, in turn, three 
very important activities which diaspora leaders use to consolidate support for the LTTE, namely 
intra-Tamil communication, political lobbying and outreach from the community, and 
fundraising. Through varying degrees of support and participation in these activities, the 
diaspora sustained the LTTE and thus played a role in the perpetuation of conflict in Sri Lanka.  
This paper has argued that diaspora communities also have the potential to play a significant role 
in peace-building and conflict resolution processes in their homeland.  
The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 has created an opening whereby efforts can be 
undertaken to utilize the well-established Tamil diaspora for post-conflict peace-building. This 
article provides a three-tier prescription as one possible way forward. First, host governments 
should acknowledge the significance of diaspora communities in relation to homeland conflict 
and seek to engage them. Second, this relationship can be built by encouraging the diaspora 
community to reconsider the violent LTTE separatist agenda and strive for peaceful solutions. 
13
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Third, in order for the latter to be successful, legitimate Tamil grievances must be addressed by 
the Sri Lankan government through pressure from the international community.  
After decades of civil war in Sri Lanka, the opportunity for peace-building has arrived. As 
responsible citizens of Canada, a country which hosts the largest Tamil diaspora in the world, 
there is an obligation to move forward proactively, engage with the generally respected 
government, and find a suitable, sustainable, and peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict and 
Tamil struggle. Members of the Tamil diaspora are members of Canada’s immediate community, 
but are also intimately connected to another community in another part of the world. Thus, 
Canada plays a unique role in post-conflict reconstruction in Sri Lanka, a role that Canada 
should embrace carefully, but without hesitation.   
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